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THE TURN AGAINST
LEGAL REFORM
Carl Minzner
Carl Minzner is associate professor at Fordham Law School in New 
York, specializing in Chinese law and governance. He is the author of 
numerous works on judicial reform, citizen petitioning, and social un-
rest in China, including “China’s Turn Against Law,” American Jour-
nal of Comparative Law (2011).
What will be the future of China’s authoritarian political system?
Many predicted that China’s rapid development over the past sev-
eral decades would inevitably lead to gradual liberalization. Economic 
growth was expected to generate a cascade of changes—first to soci-
ety, then law, and eventually politics. Events appeared to confirm these 
projections. As Chinese authorities opened up the economy in the late 
twentieth century, they also launched sweeping reforms of the nation’s 
legislative and judicial institutions. 
The events of the past decade, however, have called these assump-
tions into question. From 2000 to 2011, per capita GDP in China more 
than quintupled, skyrocketing from US$949 to $5,445. But one-party 
rule remains intact under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and 
Chinese authorities have turned against many of the legal reforms 
that they themselves enacted back in the 1980s and 1990s. Lawyers 
have come under increased pressure. Political campaigns warning 
against rule-of-law norms have rippled through the courts. And under 
new policies making “stability maintenance” (weiwen) a top priority, 
central authorities have massively increased funding for extralegal 
institutions aimed at channeling, curtailing, and suppressing citizen 
discontent.
These shifts have choked off institutions for venting dissatisfaction 
and redressing ills that are key to the CCP’s continued resilience as an 
authoritarian regime. The changes have fueled social unrest, funneling 
citizen grievances into a rising tide of street protests instead of insti-
tutionalized legal or political participation. And they have led to new 
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worries at the center regarding the danger posed by individual CCP of-
ficials (such as disgraced Chongqing CCP boss Bo Xilai) seizing parts 
of the weiwen apparatus for their own ends. For precisely these reasons, 
an increasing number of officials, academics, and activists have called 
on central authorities to revive flagging legal reforms in the wake of the 
November 2012 leadership succession. 
China may indeed be at a tipping point. But it is not clear which way 
it will tip. Authorities may restart legal reform as part of a comprehen-
sive program of political and institutional transformation. Or they may 
refuse, risking an escalating spiral of social and political turmoil.1
Late Twentieth-Century Reforms
In the 1970s and 1980s, CCP authorities turned their backs on decades 
of political radicalism and socialist economic policies. They launched ex-
tensive legal reforms aimed at building new structures to govern China. 
Officials reopened law schools shuttered during the turmoil of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–76). They used academic and professional 
exchanges to aggressively import foreign legal concepts. They issued 
hundreds of new statutes and regulations, creating a comprehensive 
framework of civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative law. Au-
thorities promoted court trials, conducted according to these newly pro-
mulgated laws, as the preferred venue for resolving ordinary civil or 
commercial grievances and disputes. In 1989, Chinese authorities even 
issued an administrative litigation law giving ordinary citizens limited 
rights to sue state authorities in court. 
Reforms continued throughout the 1990s. Authorities professional-
ized the judiciary, moving away from the practice of staffing courts with 
former military officers. They removed definitions of lawyers as “state 
legal workers” and privatized the bar. By the early 2000s, the state-
owned law firms of the 1980s had given way to an explosion of private 
firms, domestic and foreign alike. In 1997, central authorities adopted 
“rule according to law” (yifa zhiguo) as a core Party slogan. Parallel 
constitutional amendments followed two years later. Legal reform even 
emerged as a subject in China’s foreign relations, with U.S. and Chinese 
diplomats agreeing to initiate cooperative exchanges on legal reform.
Naturally, Chinese leaders aimed to advance their own interests 
through these reforms. Ideologically, they wanted an alternative source 
of legitimacy to Maoist revolutionary principles on which to ground 
their rule. Practically, they desired new mechanisms to help resolve 
the mounting social conflicts created by rapid economic development 
and urbanization. Law, litigation, and courts seemed to be the solution. 
Administratively, central leaders sought new ways to monitor their lo-
cal officials and better respond to pervasive principal-agent problems 
within the bureaucracy. They also wanted to gather better information 
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on domestic problems facing China. Allowing citizens a limited ability 
to challenge local officials through court channels, or to offer opinions 
through legislative ones, promised to help address these concerns.
As Andrew Nathan noted in 2003, these reforms helped to strengthen 
the internal stability of the Chinese state.2 They institutionalized CCP 
rule. They channeled popular discontent (regarding violations of citi-
zens’ rights or official abuses of power) into institutions within the ex-
isting political system, rather than radical underground organizations 
seeking to overturn the party-state. Legal reforms also played an impor-
tant role in foreign policy. Rule-of-law discussions with foreign gov-
ernments, for example, provided a politically more acceptable forum 
for discussing human rights in advance of China’s 2001 entry into the 
World Trade Organization.
Central reforms emboldened bureaucrats farther down the ladder to 
push institutional change forward under the rule-of-law banner. By the 
late 1990s, Chinese legal academia was abuzz with discussions of con-
stitutionalism and constitutional supremacy (xianfa zhishang). In 2001, 
the Supreme People’s Court (China’s highest judicial body) took the 
groundbreaking step of authorizing a provincial court to actually ap-
ply the (otherwise nonjusticiable) Chinese constitution in an individual 
case. Some local courts began to push the boundaries of their authority, 
independently proclaiming the invalidity of local rules and regulations 
that contradicted national law.3
Citizens used the new channels to protect their own interests. Civil 
and administrative cases multiplied. Farmers employed central authori-
ties’ rule-of-law rhetoric to challenge illegal local exactions and land 
seizures. By the early 2000s, a cadre of public-interest lawyers and legal 
activists (such as Chen Guangcheng) had emerged. They fused public-
interest lawsuits and savvy media strategies to push for deeper reform, 
with some resounding successes. In 2003, after a migrant named Sun 
Zhigang died at the hands of city authorities in Guangzhou (Canton), 
three legal academics mounted a petition to the national legislature chal-
lenging the legality and constitutionality of the extrajudicial adminis-
trative system used to detain him. At the same time, extensive media 
coverage generated a public uproar regarding official abuses in Sun’s 
case and similar ones. Remarkably, central authorities yielded—annul-
ling the entire detention system nationwide.4
The Counterreaction 
Despite the hopeful signs visible nearly a decade ago, officials have 
turned against their earlier reforms. Some concerns are practical. Late 
twentieth-century reforms were designed to steer civil and commercial 
disputes into trials before local courts. But rural China has limited le-
gal resources. Trained judges and licensed lawyers are in short supply. 
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Courts remain institutionally weak and commonly find it hard to enforce 
their verdicts. As China entered the twenty-first century, such problems 
led to violent showdowns between local courts and aggrieved citizens 
seeking justice, as well as surging numbers of extralegal petitions and 
protests to higher authorities regarding lower-court decisions.
Other concerns are explicitly political. State media have cautioned 
that “judicial concepts . . . not in accordance with [Chinese] national 
sentiment have ‘blown into the East from the West.’”5 Party authorities 
have warned that some judges have falsely used concepts such as “the 
supremacy of the law” as an excuse to avoid or oppose CCP leadership 
in judging cases.6
This has generated a backlash. Since the early 2000s, Chinese au-
thorities have shifted citizen disputes away from court trials that are 
decided according to law. Judges face new pressures to resolve cases 
through closed-door mediation. Community mediation institutions dat-
ing from the era of Chairman Mao Zedong (d. 1976) have been dusted 
off and revived. New extralegal Party-led “coordination sessions” have 
been created, under the rubric of mediation, to handle those cases that 
officials fear are most likely to generate social protest. 
In some areas, these efforts have permitted meaningful local ex-
periments that may respond better to rural needs than the formal legal 
channels emphasized during the late twentieth century. In others, they 
have become convenient rationales for local authorities to abandon le-
gal norms entirely as they seek to shore up social stability at all costs, 
whether by suppressing the legitimate grievances of individual petition-
ers or by caving in to mass complaints with no legal basis, but backed 
by many angry citizens.
Party authorities have also attempted to rein in politically wayward 
judges. In 2006, CCP officials launched new campaigns within the court 
system stressing loyalty to the Party and cautioning against Western rule-
of-law norms. In 2008, central authorities installed a CCP functionary 
with no formal legal experience as head of the Supreme People’s Court. 
There followed the so-called Three Supremes (sange zhishang) cam-
paign—an effort to remind judges that CCP policies and “the people’s 
will” are equal to (or above) the constitution. Lest anyone miss the mes-
sage, both law-school curricula and the national bar examination were 
amended to include the content of these campaigns as mandatory subjects.
Lawyers have come under increased pressure. Party campaigns have 
labeled them “socialist legal workers” and pressed for creation of CCP 
cells within law firms. Loyalty oaths to the Party are now required to 
obtain a license to practice law. Authorities have escalated harassment 
and abuse of well-known public-interest lawyers and legal activists by 
shuttering the organizations of some and subjecting others to imprison-
ment, house arrest, and periodic disappearance or torture. 
In short, CCP leaders are trying to neuter the very rule-of-law pres-
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sures that they themselves unleashed in the late twentieth century. They 
have sought to close down rhetoric (constitutionalism), channels (court 
trials), and social forces (lawyers) that activists had used to mobilize 
for greater change. And they have reasserted control over state actors 
(judges and courts) who might have been tempted to forget the realities 
of Communist Party control. 
Where such concerns are absent, reforms have continued. In the area 
of criminal justice, for instance, Chinese authorities have developed 
noncustodial pilot programs for juvenile offenders. The 2012 Criminal 
Procedure Law creates additional protections for juveniles facing inter-
rogation and trial. With regard to death-penalty cases, Chinese judicial 
authorities have made efforts to increase transparency and improve ju-
dicial review. As a result, foreign experts estimate that the number of 
executions in China has dropped by roughly half since 2007, to about 
four thousand in 2011.7 
Tough central policies have generated a range of perverse effects. 
Ironically, they have heightened social unrest. Many citizens with en-
vironmental or land grievances against local authorities have concluded 
that the best chance for obtaining redress does not lie within state legal 
institutions that have been gradually undermined. Instead, they are in-
creasingly resorting to direct (and sometimes violent) collective street 
actions, seeking to force central officials to intervene and local authori-
ties to cave in. In response, central authorities have greatly increased the 
funding and influence of domestic-security organs. This has permitted 
some local governments to devolve into quasi-feudal satrapies in which 
officials use massive funds (and the politically correct justification of 
“maintaining social stability”) to suppress legitimate citizen complaints, 
hide their own misdeeds, and enrich themselves through corruption. 
Reform on the Rebound or Descent to Disorder?
The fall of rising Party star Bo Xilai in the first half of 2012 dramati-
cally drew attention to these problems. Central leaders voiced concern 
about the ability of one of their own to amass huge, unchecked personal 
power and to challenge the low-key collective leadership norms that 
had prevailed since the beginning of the reform period two decades ago. 
Liberal scholars and officials used the Bo affair to criticize the CCP’s 
turn against legal reform since the early 2000s.
Over the past year, indications have emerged that the counterreaction 
against legal reform may have now generated a backlash of its own. 
Central authorities have moved to downgrade the power of the CCP 
political-legal apparatus. The new CCP general secretary, Xi Jinping, 
has begun to revive language regarding law and legal reform that had 
gone into eclipse in recent years. Top Party leaders have issued new 
calls  for applying rule-of-law principles to the task of upholding social 
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Like China today, late 
nineteenth-century 
Czarist Russia enjoyed 
decades of economic 
growth at rates that out-
paced those of the United 
States and European na-
tions, notwithstanding a 
bureaucratic-authoritar-
ian political system that 
foreign observers saw as 
badly outdated.
stability. A new State Council white paper suggests that recent political 
campaigns in the judiciary may be wound down. 
If implemented, such changes might represent a tipping point in Chi-
nese legal reform. Central authorities may have recognized that if China 
is to solve its pressing problems, it will 
need meaningful institutions that can 
place independent checks on official 
power and provide bottom-up channels 
for citizen participation. 
China today might be on the verge 
of a complex transition that parallels 
developments in South Korea and Tai-
wan during the 1970s and 1980s. In 
both cases, authoritarian powerhold-
ers pursued gradual political reform, 
opened the institutions of government 
to increasing levels of external civic 
pressure, and slowly but successfully 
shifted to more liberal systems of gov-
ernment. Today, both countries belong 
securely in the ranks of the world’s de-
veloped democracies.
But it remains uncertain that China will steer such a hopeful course. 
The CCP’s ruling elite could end up rejecting reform rather than embrac-
ing it. If so, China in the twenty-first century might resemble nineteenth-
century Russia more than twentieth-century South Korea or Taiwan.
Like China today, late nineteenth-century Czarist Russia enjoyed de-
cades of economic growth at rates that outpaced those of the United 
States and European nations, notwithstanding a bureaucratic-authoritar-
ian political system that foreign observers saw as badly outdated. As 
the century drew to a close, speculation ran rampant as to when Russia 
might surpass Western powers in economic and military might. 
Russia also found itself in the throes of massive domestic change. 
Military humiliation at the hands of Western powers in the first in-
ternational war of the industrial age (the Crimean War of 1853–56) 
had exposed Russia’s technological inferiority. As a result, the Rus-
sian imperial state initiated extensive economic and social reforms. 
Serfdom was abolished and peasants received more rights. Industri-
alization reworked the fabric of Russian life, bringing a tide of rural 
migrants to urban factories. Worker protests over conditions and pay 
began to erupt with increasing frequency. The new social media of the 
era—printed periodicals—permitted an educated elite to rapidly dis-
seminate ideas throughout the country, often resorting to allusions or 
coded language to avoid imperial censors. 
Czarist authorities launched sweeping legal reforms as well. They 
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imported foreign legal institutions including models of legal education; 
a professional bar; Western-style courts and juries; and civil, commer-
cial, and criminal codes. Excitement was palpable. “The slogans in the 
air in the 1860s were due process, open court proceedings, trial by jury, 
and irremovable judges.”8 Officials even established local representa-
tive assemblies with limited powers of self-government. 
Citizens took eagerly to these new channels. Reformers sought to use 
local assemblies to gradually push the imperial regime in a more liberal 
direction. Radical activists took advantage of legal novelties such as 
open court proceedings and independent judges in order to turn trials 
into platforms calling for greater political change. In 1878, a young an-
archist named Vera Zasulich became an instant media sensation when, 
after her arrest for trying to assassinate an imperial governor, the trial 
judge resisted government efforts to tamper with the case; her lawyer 
managed to turn the public proceedings into an indictment of police bru-
tality; a jury of sympathetic citizens returned a verdict of “not guilty”; 
and crowds erupted into public demonstrations upon her release. 
Such developments caused serious worry among political elites. As 
in China today, rule-of-law institutions came under increasing suspi-
cion from an authoritarian regime dead set against fundamental politi-
cal reform—particularly after anarchists assassinated the reformist Czar 
Alexander II in 1881. Under his successor, Russian authorities launched 
a two-decade–long rollback of liberal policies. They curtailed public 
trials, limited the rights of juries, asserted control over bar associations, 
removed political trials from the regular court system, and drastically 
reduced the powers of local assemblies. 
Beginning in the late 1870s, imperial authorities also built up an 
extensive police state (one might call it “social-stability maintenance 
with Russian characteristics”). They increasingly took responsibility for 
upholding law and order out of the hands of judges and gave it to the 
police, including the Okhrana (the Czarist secret service). Agents of the 
latter enjoyed dramatically expanded powers that allowed them to detain 
and internally exile anyone even suspected of political crimes. 
Of course, these measures did not succeed in stamping out all dissent. 
The existence of private property meant that there were limits on impe-
rial power. Wealthy patrons continued to employ reformist intellectuals, 
despite state efforts to isolate them. Dissident authors continued to find 
markets for their works, notwithstanding state efforts to censor them. 
The key result of Czarist counterreform in the late nineteenth cen-
tury was to radicalize society. The imperial turn against law convinced 
moderates that gradual reform of the regime was impossible. Decades 
of indiscriminate state repression pushed together liberal constitution-
alists, anarchist terrorists, religious nationalists, radical socialists, and 
ordinary citizens outraged by violations of their rights. And it drove all 
of them to adopt ever more extreme political positions. 
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Further, as imperial rule entered its waning years, hard-line policies 
helped to prevent the emergence of any organized and institutionalized 
political opposition. Like China today, imperial Russia had no Taiwan-
ese dangwai (outside the party) movement, no South Korean opposition 
political parties, no Polish Solidarity trade union. It crushed any effort to 
organize these. This produced a surface veneer of political stability. But 
it also ensured that no coherent force existed to step into the void and 
pick up the power lying in the streets once the Czarist state finally crum-
bled. Instead, there was only a chaotic assortment of military strongmen, 
popular mobs, radicalized intellectuals, and—detraining ominously at 
the Finland Station—committed underground revolutionaries hardened 
by decades of repression.
Of course, China is not there . . . yet. Despite increasing domestic 
unrest, slowing economic growth, and rising tensions with neighbors, 
central leaders retain a firm grip on the levers of power. And despite 
the recent official turn against legal reforms, most activists still hope 
for (and seek) gradual reform of the Chinese state. They do not desire 
a radical upheaval that would shatter it. They want a soft rather than a 
hard landing.
But the risk of a hard landing is real. Pressures are building. Open 
legal and political channels are needed to funnel them in the direction of 
gradual change. If China does not build these now, it will not simply tip 
into transition, but rather plummet into cataclysm. 
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